Synthesis Report
NIDS-CRAM Wave 2

Nic Spaul - University of Stellenbosch
Adeola Oyedepo - University of the Witwatersrand
Andrew Kerr - University of Cape Town
Brendan Maughan-Brown - University of Cape Town
Cally Ardington - University of Cape Town
Carmen Christian – University of the Western Cape
Debra Shepherd - University of Stellenbosch
Daniela Casale – University of the Witwatersrand
Gabriel Espi - University of the Witwatersrand
Gabrielle Wills - University of Stellenbosch
Grace Bridgman – University of Stellenbosch
Haroon Bhorat - University of Cape Town
Ivan Turok - Human Sciences Research Council
Ihsaan Bassier - University of Massachusetts Amherst
Jesal Kika-Mistry - University of Stellenbosch
Janeli Kotze - Department of Basic Education
Joshua Budlender - University of Massachusetts Amherst
Justin Visagie - Human Sciences Research Council
Kim Ingle - University of Cape Town
Laura Rossouw – University of the Witwatersrand
Leila Patel – University of Johannesburg
Miracle Benhura - University of the Witwatersrand
Murray Leibbrandt - University of Cape Town
Nompumelelo Mohohlwane - Department of Basic Education
Prudence Magejo – University of the Witwatersrand
René English - University of Stellenbosch
Reza C. Daniels – University of Cape Town
Robert Hill - University of Cape Town
Rocco Zizzamia - University of Oxford
Ronak Jain - Harvard University
Ronelle Burger – University of Stellenbosch
Rulof Burger - University of Stellenbosch
Stephen Taylor - Department of Basic Education
Servaes van der Berg - University of Stellenbosch
Timothy Köhler - University of Cape Town
Tim Brophy - University of Cape Town
Umakrishnan Kollamparambil - University of the Witwatersrand
Vimal Ranchhod - University of Cape Town

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This synthesis report is split into 7 sections. These sections draw from the papers listed above, specifically: (1) Employment: Jain et al.; Ranchhod & Daniels; Casale & Shepherd; Hill & Kohler (2) Employment and location, Visagie & Turok; Ranchhod & Daniels (3) Education, Mohohlwane et al. (4) ECD, Wills et al. (5) Hunger, Bridgman et al.; Visagie & Turok; Mohohlwane et al. (6) Grants, Hill & Kohler; Casale & Shepherd, Visagie & Turok (7) Health, Oyenubi & Kollamparabil; Burger et al. All papers are available for download at https://cramsurvey.org/reports/ The NIDS-CRAM data is freely available for download at the Data First Open Data Portal: https://www.datafirst.uct.ac.za/
1. Employment

1. The 3-million jobs lost between February and April have not returned by June. Between February and April 2020 NIDS-CRAM Wave 1 data indicates that the percentage of those not employed increased from 43% to 53% (13,7mil to 16,5mil). Wave 2 data show that that number has not changed from April to June, despite the easing of lockdown. The evidence to date suggests that these losses may be long lasting. Wave 3 and Wave 4 data should shed more light on the permanence of these losses.

2. The number of furloughed workers has returned to pre-COVID levels with half of furloughed workers being ‘re-employed’ and about 40% becoming unemployed. NIDS-CRAM Wave 1 indicated that over and above the 3-million job losses between February and April, an additional 1,4-million people (4,6% of working age adults) were furloughed – i.e. they did not work and did not get paid but said they had a job to return to). In June, this additional group of furloughed workers have almost disappeared, with the number of workers on furlough returning to their February levels. Only half (54%) of furloughed workers in April were ‘re-employed’ in June, while nearly 40% fell into non-employment with the remainder still being furloughed in June (Table 1 from Jain et al. 2020). Maintaining some form of employment relationship seems to have been crucial for recovering employment.

Table 1: April to June transitions by labour-market category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Employed or paid leave</th>
<th>Furloughed</th>
<th>Not employed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APRIL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed or paid leave</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furloughed</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not employed</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jain et al. (2020), Figure 1, NIDS-CRAM Wave 1 and 2 data.
Note: For example, of those who were furloughed in April, 54% were employed in June.

3. Although most groups experienced some ‘bounce-back’ between April and June, employment levels remain well below February levels. The lowest levels and slowest recoveries were experienced by disadvantaged groups. The graph below from Ranchhod & Daniels (2020) reports employment rates by sub-group for February, April and June. While all groups reported here have experienced some ‘bounce-back’, recovery rates are lowest for Black Africans, those with less than matric and those in Traditional areas. In these three groups only about one fifth of the loss has been regained.
4. From February to June 2020 workers who were poor, rural, female, unskilled and less educated have experienced the largest declines in employment. Excluding changes in temporary non-employment, the percentage decline in employment between February and June was ten times higher for the poorest 50% of workers (31% net decline) compared to the richest 25% of workers (3% net decline). Informal workers faced twice the employment loss of formal workers (14% compared to 7%).

5. Bounce-back of furloughed workers experienced across industries but concentrated in services, sales, elementary occupations and craft industries. Among those that reported having an employment relationship there was a sharp increase in non-furloughed workers between April and June with the largest increases in Services and sales (+17p.p), Elementary occupations (+15p.p), and Craft and related occupations (+11p.p).
6. **Only 1-in-4 workers (24%) said they could work from home in June.** Wage employed respondents were asked if they could work from home and 15% reported “Mostly”, 9% reported “Sometimes” and 76% reported “Never.” If one combines “Sometimes” and “Mostly” the highest rates of reported ability to work from home were seen among White respondents (79%) those with post-matric qualifications (40%) and older workers (50-59) (30%) with the lowest rates for Black Africans (16%), those with matric or less (15%) and those living in Farms and Traditional areas (11-19%).

7. **Although there was some narrowing of the gap between men and women between April and June, women have still experienced greater job losses during the pandemic.** Between February and April employment declined considerably more for women (-23%) than for men (-10%). From April to June there were only very small changes in employment, although they were in favor of women (+3% for women and -4% for men). However, the total change over the whole period (February to June) still shows much higher employment losses for women (-20%) than men (-13%). Put differently, while women accounted for just under half (47%) of those employed in February, they accounted for 58% of net job losses over the whole period (i.e. February to June).

8. **Childcare is affecting women’s labour market outcomes more than men’s.** More than twice the number of women than men (roughly 3.4 million women versus 1.7 million men) said that looking after children in June prevented them from going to work or made work very difficult. Similar numbers reported difficulty working the same hours as before lockdown or searching for work as a result of childcare responsibilities.

9. **Widening gender wage gap among the poor between February and June 2020.** Although the gap is evident in both periods across the whole earnings distribution, wage inequality between men and women in the poorest 40% of the distribution has increased by a factor of up to 5 between February and June. Hill & Kohler (2020) find that the driving force behind the widening gap is an adjustment in working hours that has been disproportionately borne by women. This may have to do with women being employed in jobs that are less amenable to working from home, or disproportionate childcare responsibilities during the lockdown. One possible policy to address this would be an extension of the Child Support Grant since it is well-targeted to poor households and 98% of primary caregivers are women.
2. Employment & location

1. **Rural areas have been more affected by job losses than urban areas.** Between February and April all regions lost about one fifth of their jobs; however between April and June metros and cities/towns started to recover while rural areas seemed to lag behind. The figure below shows that looking at the employment rates across area types, those in rural areas were the only ones who did not experience any ‘bounce-back’ in terms of employment. Among those who were not employed in April, 20% of metro residents found jobs, 16% of city/town residents found jobs, and only 13% of rural residents found jobs.

   **Figure 5:** Employment to population ratio by area type (February, April and June 2020)

   ![Employment to population ratio by area type](image)

   **Source:** Figures from Visagie & Turok, 2020

2. **Rural areas and peri-urban areas hardest hit by unemployment.** The broad rate of unemployment in June was considerably higher in rural areas (52%) compared to cities/towns (43%) and metros (35%). Similarly, in urban areas those living in peri-urban areas were twice as likely to be unemployed (52%) compared to those living in suburbs (24%). Put differently, 1-in-2 people in rural areas and peri-urban areas who want work, have work; compared to 2-in-3 people living in metro areas and 3-in-4 people living in suburbs. Suburban residents were least affected by the shock of lockdown and the pandemic and had the lowest rates of unemployment at the start and end of the period.

3. **Workers in rural areas are more likely to be searching for employment but also considerably less likely to find employment than those in urban areas.** The rural farm geographical area showed a doubling of the percentage looking for work (the searching unemployed), from 20% to 40%. This happened while the employment-to-population ratio in these areas declined from 50% to 47%. This means that new job opportunities in the formal rural sector were declining at the same time as more people were looking for work – a particularly difficult situation for rural people.
3. Education

1. **Increasing educational inequality during lockdown.** Wealthy children were twice as likely to attend school despite their grade being ‘closed’ compared to children in no-fee schools. Although there were no reported differences in school attendance rates by wealth for open grades in July (approximately 70-80% attendance rates for all groups), there were large differences in school attendance rates for closed grades. Some schools received exemptions to stay open (including but not limited to independent/private schools). Rates of school attendance for children in grades that were not yet open were approximately 15-20% for no-fee schools (poorest 80%) but nearly 50% for fee-charging schools (wealthiest 10%). This is likely to increase educational inequality.

**Figure 6: Estimated attendance rates by quintile/decile of per capita income in July**

Source: Mohohlwane et al. (2020) NIDS-CRAM, Wave 2 (2020)

Note: Attendance rates for “open” grades (6, 7, 11 and 12) and grades “not yet open” (1 - 5, 8 - 10) are pooled for this figure to achieve a large enough sample size. Quintiles/deciles are based on per capita income of households in NIDS 2017.

2. **40% of school days will be lost for most children in 2020.** Analysis of the new school calendar shows that for Grades 1,2,3,4,5,8,9 and 10 children will have lost between 82-87 school days or 40-43% of the typically scheduled schools days in a school year.

3. **72% of respondents in households with children said they were “very worried” about their children returning to school.** Rates of worry are significantly lower for the wealthiest 10% of respondents (43% very worried). There is also some evidence that worry is linked to having very young children (<7 years) and older (60+) residents in the household.

4. **Parents sent their children back to school irrespective of their reported rates of worry.** There is no difference in reported school attendance rates between those who report being “very worried” and those who are “not worried” or “a little worried”, especially for open grades. For households with open grades approximately 75% of respondents said their children had gone back to school and this did not differ based on reported level of worry. For grades that were not yet open there are lower rates of reported attendance for those who were ‘very worried’ (19%) compared to those that were “a little worried” (28%). It would seem that when grades were officially open parents chose to send their children back to school even if they were very worried.
**Figure 7:** Reported school attendance of children in the household by official Grade return status and level of concern about learners’ return to school during the COVID-19 pandemic

![Graph showing school attendance by concern level and official grade return status.](image)

*Source: Mohohlwane et al. (2020) NIDS-CRAM, Wave 2 (2020)*

### 4. Early Childhood Development

1. **The Early Childhood Development (ECD) sector was operating at just a quarter of its pre-crisis levels a month after programmes could reopen.** Only 13% of children aged 0-6 were attending ECD programmes by mid-July to mid-August compared to 47% in 2018.

**Figure 8:** Percentage of respondents who report ECD programme attendance of any child aged 0-6 in the household (1) before the lockdown in March, (2) during the opening-up of the economy in June, and (3) after the official ECD opening date (end July- mid August)

![Graph showing ECD programme attendance by month.](image)

*Source: Wills et al. (2020), NIDS-CRAM 2020, Wave 2. Note: sample limited to respondents in households with children under aged 0-6*
2. **Huge decline in ECD attendance relative to historical levels.** According to the General Household Survey (GHS 2018) approximately 47% of children aged 0-6 attended an ECD facility in 2018. The comparable figure in July/August (NIDS-CRAM Wave 2) is 13%. The last time that ECD attendance rates were as low as this was in the early 2000s. ECD attendance rates are currently the lowest they have been in 18 years. At this point it is not yet clear what proportion of these declines are only temporary, or whether there will be a lasting impact on ECD enrolment in the country.

![Figure 9: ECD attendance rates of children aged 0-6 from 2002-2018 (GHS) against NIDS-CRAM estimates for 2020](image)

3. **Supply-side factors are the primary reason for low levels of ECD attendance.** When asked what the main reason was for why children had not returned to ECD programmes, two-thirds of responses relate to supply-side factors such as ‘the temporary closure of ECD programmes’ (56%), centres were ‘not yet ready to re-open’ (5%) and programmes had ‘closed-down permanently’ (4%). The delayed reopening of ECD programmes is confirmed by the ‘Second Survey Assessing the Impact of COVID on ECD’. One month after ECD programmes were officially allowed to open, 68% of about 5,300 ECD practitioners responding to this online survey by September 7 said that they had not yet reopened their programmes. The two main reasons for not having reopened were “We cannot afford to buy the health and hygiene things we need to reopen” (42%) and “We don’t have enough money to reopen” (35%). A further 15% mentioned that they were not able to meet the Department of Social Development (DSD) requirements to reopen.

4. **Demand side factors affecting attendance.** Children were more likely to have returned to ECD programmes in July/August if learners in the household had attended school in the past 7 days, if the respondent had stable employment, if respondents were ‘not worried’ or ‘only a little worried’ about COVID-19 or if they lived in an urban area rather than rural area. Nearly a third of respondents (27%) cited fears of children being infected by the coronavirus at ECD programmes as the main reason for not sending their children back.

5. **Households are not ‘outsourcing’ childcare as a coping strategy.** 88% of respondents residing with children that had not returned to ECD programmes, indicated that either they themselves, or another adult in the household was looking after the child/children who had not returned to ECD programmes. “Outsourcing” of care beyond the household seems uncommon.

6. **Women are bearing the brunt of additional childcare responsibilities due to ECD closures.** 38% of men and women residing with their own children said at least one child aged 0-6 in the household had been attending an ECD programme before the crisis. When asked who was now looking after children that weren’t back at ECD programmes, 67% of women versus 25% of men said they were looking after these children themselves.

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1 The First and Second Surveys Assessing the Impact of COVID on ECD was conducted by a collaboration of partners in the ECD sector namely: BRIDGE, Ilifa Labantwana, the National ECD Alliance, the Nelson Mandela Foundation, Smart Start and the SA Congress for ECD.
5. Hunger

1. **Reported adult and child hunger both declined by 27% between May/June and July/August.** Between Wave 1 and 2 of NIDS-CRAM it is clear that reported hunger has declined for ‘anyone in the household’ (22% → 16%) and children (15% → 11%) representing a 27% decline. These new lower rates are still substantially higher than pre-COVID levels.

2. **About 20% fewer households ran out of money to buy food in June compared to April, yet this measure of food insecurity is still at least twice as high as in 2016.** In Wave 1, 47% of respondents indicated that their household had run out of money to buy food in April; in Wave 2 this had declined to 37% for the month of June.

   ![Figure 10: Household and child hunger, and money for food, Wave 1 and Wave 2](image)

   **Source:** Bridgman et al., 2020

3. **Only 25% of respondents indicated that a child received a school meal in the last 7 days, compared to 80% pre-COVID.** Reported rates of children receiving a free school meal in the last 7 days were much higher for households with open grade learners (50%) compared to households with closed grade learners (10%) during July and August. (i.e. for grades that were re-opened incrementally). This figure would typically be 80% under ‘normal’ schooling.

4. **Hunger is highest in rural areas.** Although running out of money to buy food is similar across regions and has declined between April and June, experiencing hunger is highest in rural areas compared to metros and cities/towns. One in 5 respondents in rural areas (20%) said that someone in their household had gone hungry in the last 7 days compared to 16% in cities/towns and 13% in metro areas.
5. **In urban areas, shack-dwellers are most vulnerable to hunger.** Approximately 1-in-8 respondents (13%) indicated that they lived in “an informal house like a shack.” These respondents were considerably more likely to report running out of money to buy food and experiencing hunger in the last 7 days. Half of shack-dwellers (51%) reported running out of money to buy food in June and 22% reported that someone in their household went hungry in the previous 7 days. These are nearly 40% higher than the national averages (37% and 16% respectively).
6. **GRANTS**

1. **The special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress (SRD) Grant has brought millions of previously unreached individuals into the system, and application for and receipt of the grant have been relatively pro-poor.** As of the time of the survey, we estimate that of the 11.3 million individuals who applied for the grant, nearly two in every five were successful. Of those who received the grant, the majority were in low-income households: for every individual who lived in quintile 5 households and received the grant in June, nearly four who lived in quintile 1 households received it. However, many of these recipients were previously in the middle of the household income distribution pre-crisis but have shifted down due to the pandemic.

**Figure 13:** Distribution of personal receipt of the special COVID-19 SRD grant across the household income distribution, June 2020

![Distribution of personal receipt of the special COVID-19 SRD grant across the household income distribution, June 2020](image)

**Source:** Köhler and Bhorat (2020), NIDS-CRAM Wave 2.

2. **Gender.** Although women accounted for 58% of net job losses, only 34% of COV-19 SRD grant recipients were women, and only 41% of UIF/UIF-TERS beneficiaries were women. While women accounted for just under half (47%) of those employed in February, they still accounted for 58% of net job losses over the whole period (i.e. February to June). However, only 41% of the UIF/UIF-TERS beneficiaries and 34% of those who had been paid the Covid-19 SRD grant in June were women. The latter is likely due to working-age individuals not being able to hold the new grant concurrently with the Child Support Grant (CSG) - and the majority of CSG holders are women.

3. **Rural communities have been much bigger beneficiaries of government grants than the metros and smaller cities/towns, and are likely to be most vulnerable if they are reduced/removed.** Nearly three out of five rural respondents (59%) lived in households receiving social grants in June 2020, compared with less than half in cities/towns (47%) and one in three in the metros (32%). This was because rural residents were far less likely to be in paid employment. Government grants have clearly helped to protect rural livelihoods and compensate these areas for their weak local economies and lack of jobs.

4. **Those on the peripheries of cities are more likely to receive grants.** More than half of peri-urban respondents (54%) lived in households receiving social grants, compared with less than half of township residents (45%), two in five shack dwellers (40%) and one in four suburban residents (26%). The implication is that government grants have helped to offset unemployment and poverty in townships and informal settlements. The premature withdrawal of social programmes could aggravate conditions in poor urban communities.

5. **Rural residents are more likely to be COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress (SRD) grant recipients than city residents.** One in three rural residents (33%) said that someone in their household had received the new
Covid-19 grant, compared with one in four in cities/towns (24%) and one in five in the metros (21%). These differences are smaller than for other grants, suggesting that the Covid-19 grant is benefiting people who did not qualify for government support before, such as unemployed men. Among urban residents, 29% of peri-urban residents said their households had received the Covid-19 grant, compared with 27% in townships, 18% of shack dwellers and 16% in suburban areas. The proportion of shack dwellers receiving these and other grants is surprisingly low considering their levels of poverty and distress.

Figure 14: Geographic type: Percentage adults reporting their household received a COVID-19 SRD Grant (with 90% confidence interval)

Source: Visagie & Turok, 2020, NIDS-CRAM: Wave 2

6. Despite the COVID-19 grant’s progressivity, the extent of under-coverage is regressive. In June 2020, a total of nearly 6.5 million individuals were eligible for the COVID-19 grant but did not report receipt, and half of these individuals (3.1 million) live in the poorest third of households.

7. HEALTH

Mental health

1. The prevalence of depressive symptoms seems to have doubled between 2017 and June 2020 (COVID-19 era), from 12% to 24% of individuals. Using their cut-off for depressive symptoms, Oyenubi & Kollamparabil (2020) find that while 12% of South Africans screened positive for depressive symptoms in NIDS 2017, when those same individuals were resurveyed in NIDS-CRAM Wave 2 (July/August 2020) this had increased to 24%. (Note ‘depressive symptoms’ are not the same as ‘depression’ – the latter is a medical diagnosis).

2. Relative to 2017, increases in depressive symptoms are largest for men, non-Black-Africans, those with tertiary education, and those in the wealthiest 20% of the income distribution. Contrary to what one might expect, the largest increases in reported depressive symptoms (and subsequently the highest rates) are found among historically advantaged groups with many of the pre-existing gaps in reported depressive symptoms (between men and women, between rich and poor, between tertiary-educated and those without) seem to have disappeared and in some cases even reversed.

3. Those reporting extreme hunger (hunger ‘Every day’ or ‘Almost every day’) were twice as likely to screen positive for depressive symptoms. In addition to experiencing any hunger, those respondents who reported perpetual hunger (‘Every day’ or ‘Almost every day’) had twice the prevalence of depressive symptoms (44%) compared to those who experienced hunger 1-2 days a week or not at all (about 23%).
4. **Sharp increase in mask-wearing (from 49% to 74%) and hand-sanitiser use (from 10% to 35%) between May/June and July/August.** This represents a strong increase in mask-wearing, compared to the wave 1 levels in May and June where 49% of these same respondents were wearing masks. With the return to work and expanded freedom of movement in July and August, we see a drop in physical distancing from (23% to 9%), avoiding large groups (16% to 7%) and staying at home (43% to 36%). We find a trade-off between non-pharmaceutical interventions with those who are staying at home being less likely to wear masks, and this trade-off has strengthened in July and August.

5. **Increase in risk perceptions with 50% more people reporting they think they are likely to get COVID-19.** About 1-in-3 (33%) respondents in May and June said they thought they were likely to get COVID-19. This has now increased to 1-in-2 (50%) in July and August. There is a strong relationship between the number of cases in a district and perceived risk of getting COVID-19 with higher perceived risk in districts with higher numbers of cases.

6. **High levels of agency and empowerment with no evidence of placing trust in poor science.** 87% of respondents said that they believe they can avoid the virus. Respondents who said they were unlikely to get COVID-19 explained that this was largely due to them staying at home and wearing a mask. Only 1-2% of respondents reported pseudo-science prevention strategies like eating garlic or drinking hot lemon water.
The NIDS-CRAM data is freely available for download at the Data First Open Data Portal: https://www.datafirst.uct.ac.za/
All papers are available for download at https://cramsurvey.org/reports/